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Abstract
Humans currently use arguments for explaining
choices which are already made, or for evaluat-
ing potential choices. Each potential choice has
usually pros and cons of various strengths. In
spite of the usefulness of arguments in a deci-
sion making process, there have been few for-
mal proposals handling this idea if we except
works by Fox and Parsons and by Bonet and
Geffner. In this paper we propose a possibilistic
logic framework where arguments are built from
an uncertain knowledge base and a set of priori-
tized goals. The proposed approach can compute
two kinds of decisions by distinguishing between
pessimistic and optimistic attitudes. When the
available, maybe uncertain, knowledge is consis-
tent, as well as the set of prioritized goals (which
have to be fulfilled as far as possible), the method
for evaluating decisions on the basis of argu-
ments agrees with the possibility theory-based
approach to decision-making under uncertainty.
Taking advantage of its relation with formal ap-
proaches to defeasible argumentation, the pro-
posed framework can be generalized in case of
partially inconsistent knowledge, or goal bases.
Key words: possibilistic logic, decision, argumentation.
1 Introduction
In everyday life, decision is often based on arguments and
counter-arguments. The decisions made in this way have
a basis that can be more easily referred to for explanation
purposes. Such an approach has indeed some obvious ben-
efits. On the one hand, a best choice is not only suggested
to the user, but also the reasons of this recommendation
can be provided in a format that is easy to grasp. On the
other hand, such an approach to decision making would
be more acute with the way humans often deliberate and
finally make a choice. More generally, argumentation sys-
tems (e.g. [1, 2, 6, 14, 17, 20]) have been developed in AI
and proved to be useful in a variety of tasks. In particular,
argumentation is a promising model for reasoning with in-
consistent knowledge. It follows a three steps process: con-
structing arguments and counter-arguments, then selecting
the most acceptable of them, and finally concluding.
The idea of basing decisions on arguments pro and con was
already advocated more than two hundreds years ago by
Benjamin Franklin [18]. This idea has been also at work
among critical thinking philosophers. However, there has
been almost no attempt at formalizing it until now if we
except some recent works by Fox and Parsons [17] (see
[16] for an informal and introductory discussion) and by
Bonet and Geffner [4]. However, these works suffer from
some drawbacks: the first one being based on an empirical
calculus while the second one, although more formal, does
not refer to argumentative inference. So there is a need for
a more general approach where inconsistency is handled
in an argumentative logic manner and which agrees with a
qualitative view of decision under uncertainty.
In order to keep the benefit of existing axiomatic justifica-
tions, the proposed approach is a counterpart, in terms of
logical arguments, of the possibilistic qualitative decision
setting (which has been axiomatized both in the von Neu-
mann [8] and in the Savage styles [13]). Moreover, a log-
ical representation of the possibilistic decision framework
[7] has been developed, where both the available knowl-
edge (which may be pervaded with uncertainty) and the
goals representing the user preferences (with their priority
levels) are encoded by two distinct possibilistic logic bases.
From these logical bases, it should be possible to build the
different arguments in favour and against a decision and
to compute their strengths. This framework distinguishes
between pessimistic and optimistic attitudes toward risk.
This gives birth to different types of arguments in favour
and against a possible choice.
The paper is organized in the following way. First, the pos-
sibilistic logic counterpart of possibility theory-based deci-
sion is recalled in section 2. Then Section 3 presents the de-
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cision procedure in terms of arguments-based evaluations
both in the pessimistic and in the optimistic cases, when the
knowledge base and the goal base are both consistent. Sec-
tion 4 discusses possible extensions of the approach when
these bases become inconsistent. Section 5 provides a com-
parison with Fox-Parsons and Bonet-Geffner approaches.
2 Logical handling of qualitative decision
under uncertainty
In what follows, L denotes a propositional language, `
classical inference, and ≡ logical equivalence.
In decision under uncertainty, possibilistic logic can be
used for modeling the available information about the
world on the one hand, and the preferences on the other
hand. This section summarizes a proposal made in [7, 12]
for designing a logic-based decision machinery. We distin-
guish between two possibilistic logic bases. The first one
K = {(kj , ρj); j = 1, l} represents the available knowl-
edge about the world. kj is a proposition of the language L
and the pair (kj , ρj) is understood asN(kj)≥ ρj , whereN
is a necessity measure [10]. Namely (kj , ρj) encodes that
the piece of knowledge “kj is true” holds as certain at least
at level ρj , where ρj belongs to a linearly ordered valuation
scale R where there exist a top and a bottom element which
are respectively denoted by 1 and 0.
The second possibilistic logic base G = {(gi, λi); i =
1,m} represents the preferences of the decision-maker un-
der the form of a prioritized set of goals, where gi is a
proposition of the language L and λi is the level of pri-
ority for getting the goal gi satisfied. Priority levels take
their values on another linearly ordered scale T with top
and bottom denoted 1 and 0.
We shall denote by K∗ and G∗ the corresponding sets of
classical propositions when weights are ignored.
The propositional language contains Boolean decision vari-
ables and Boolean state variables. In this setting a decision
is a conjunction of decision literals, denoted d. In this view
a do-nothing decision is represented by a tautology. The
set D gathers all the allowed decisions. Each potential de-
cision d is represented by a formula (d, 1) to be added to
K if the decision is chosen. Let Kd = K ∪ {(d, 1)} be the
description of what is known about the world when d is
applied. Associated with the possibilistic logic base Kd is
the possibility distribution piKd which defines its semantics
counterpart
piKd(ω) = minj=1,lmax(vω(kj), nR(ρj)),
which rank-orders the more or less plausible states of the
world when d is chosen, where vω(kj) = 1 if ω is a model
of kj and vω(kj) = 0 if ω falsifies kj and where nR is the
order-reversing map of R (see [10] for details).
Associated with the layered set of goals G is the ordinal
utility function
µG(ω) = mini=1,m max (vω(gi), nT (λj)),
which rank-orders the different states according to their ac-
ceptability, and where nT is the order-reversing map of T .
piKd and µG are assumed to be normalized (∃ω, piKd(ω) =
1;∃ω′, µG(ω′) = 1), which is equivalent to the consistency
of K∗ and G∗.
From piKd and µG , a pessimistic qualitative utility (see Ap-
pendix) can be computed as
E∗(d) = min
ω
max (µG(ω), n(piKd(ω))) (1)
where n is a decreasing map from R to T such that n(0)
= 1 and n(1) = 0. In the following we assume the full
commensurateness of the scales (i.e. R = T and nR = nT
= n). E∗(d) is all the greater as all the plausible states
ω according to piKd are among the most preferred states
according to µG . The pessimistic utility E∗(d) is small as
soon as there exists a possible consequence of d which is
both highly plausible and bad with respect to preferences.
This is clearly a risk-averse and thus a pessimistic attitude.
It has been shown in [7] that it is possible to computeE∗(d)
by only using a classical logic machinery on α-level cuts of
Kd and G.
Proposition 1 E∗(d) is the maximal value of α s.t.
(Kd)α ` (G)n(α) (2)
where (B)α, resp. (B)α is the set of classical propositions
in a possibilistic logic base B with a level greater or equal
to α, resp. strictly greater than α.
As seen in (2), E∗(d) is equal to 1 (α = 1) if the completely
certain part of Kd entails the satisfaction of all the goals,
even the ones with low priorities, since G0 is just the set
of all the propositions in G with a non-zero priority level.
In [7] a computation procedure using an Assumption-based
Truth Maintenance System is given for computing the best
decision in the sense of (1)-(2).
An optimistic qualitative criterion (see Appendix) is given
by
E∗(d) = max
ω
min (µG(ω), piKd(ω)) . (3)
The criterion E∗(d) corresponds to an optimistic attitude
since it is high as soon as there exists a possible con-
sequence of d which is both highly plausible and highly
prized. E∗(d) is equal to 1 as soon as one fully acceptable
choice ω (i.e., such that µG(ω) = 1) is also completely
plausible. This criterion can also be expressed in logical
terms.
Proposition 2 E∗(d) is equal to the greatest α such that
(Kd)n(α) and (G)n(α) are logically consistent together.
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Let’s consider the following example initially proposed by
Boutillier in [5]. A similar example, but stated in a medical
context, is used by Fox and Parsons [17].
Example 1 The example is about taking an umbrella or
not, knowing that the sky is cloudy. The knowledge base is
K = {(u→ l, 1), (¬u→ ¬ l, 1), (u→ ¬w, 1), (r ∧ ¬u→
w, 1), (c, 1), (¬r → ¬w, 1), (c→ r, λ)} (0 < λ < 1) with:
l: to be overloaded, r: it rains, w: being wet, u: taking
an umbrella, c: the sky is cloudy. The goals base is G =
{(¬w, 1), (¬l, σ)} with (0< σ < 1). We do not like to be
overloaded with an umbrella, but it is more important to
be dry. The set of decisions is D = {u,¬u}, i.e., taking
an umbrella or not. The best pessimistic decision is to take
an umbrella with E∗(u) = n(σ). Moreover, E∗(¬u) = 0,
E∗(u) = n(σ) and E∗(¬u) = n(λ). Thus the best decision
in the optimistic case depends on the values λ and σ.
3 Argumentation-based decision making:
Case of consistent bases
In this section, we suppose that the bases K and G are con-
sistent. Consequently, the arguments will not be conflicting
and thus the argumentation process is reduced to two steps:
constructing arguments and concluding. Moreover, due to
the use of two ‘different bases’, the arguments are defined
in an ‘original way’.
3.1 Pessimistic Criterion
In the pessimistic view, as pointed out by Proposition 1, we
are interested in finding a decision d (if it exists) such that
Kα ∧ d ` Gβ with α high and β low, i.e. such that the
decision d together with the most certain part of K entails
the satisfaction of the goals, even those with low priority. In
this case, an argument supporting a decision takes the form
of an explanation. The idea is that a decision is justified
if it leads to the satisfaction of the most important goals,
taking into account the most certain part of knowledge.
Definition 1 (Argument PRO) An argument in favor of a
decision d is a triple A = <S, C, d> such that:
• d ∈ D
• S ⊆ K∗ and C ⊆ G∗
• S ∪ {d} is consistent
• S ∪ {d} ` C
• S is minimal and C is maximal (for set inclusion)
among the sets satisfying the above conditions.
S = Support(A) is the support of the argument, C =
Consequences(A) its consequences (the goals which are
reached by the decision d) and d = Conclusion(A) is the
conclusion of the argument. The set AP gathers all the
arguments which can be constructed from <K, G, D>.
Example 2 (Cont.) In the above example, there is one ar-
gument in favor of the decision ‘u’: < {u → ¬w}, {¬w},
u>. There is also a unique argument in favor of the deci-
sion ‘¬u′: <{¬u→¬ l}, {¬l}, ¬u>.
In [1, 20], it has been argued that arguments may have dif-
ferent strengths depending on the knowledge used to con-
struct them. For instance, an argument built only from
knowledge in K1 is stronger than an argument built using
formula belonging to lower level cut ofK. In what follows,
we will define the strengths of arguments in favor of de-
cisions. In fact, an argument is evaluated from two points
of view: according to the quality of knowledge used in the
argument (the certainty level of the argument, for short the
“level” in the following), and according to the goals satis-
fied by that argument (that is why we speak about the de-
gree of satisfaction of the argument, for short the “weight”
in the following). The level of an argument is the certainty
degree of the less certain piece of knowledge used in that
argument. The weight of an argument is all the greater as
the priority degree of the most important goal which is not
satisfied by the decision is small. Note that all the goals
with a priority degree higher or equal to that degree should
be satisfied by the decision. To compute the weight, we
check the priority degree of the most important goal vio-
lated by the decision supported by that argument and we
consider the degree which is immediately higher than it in
the scale.
Definition 2 (Strength of an Argument PRO) Let A =
<S, C, d> be an argument in AP . The strength of A is
a pair <LevelP (A), WeightP (A)> such that:
• The certainty level of the argument is LevelP (A) =
min{ρi | ki ∈ S and (ki, ρi) ∈ K}. If S = ∅ then
LevelP (A) = 1.
• The degree of satisfaction of the argument is
WeightP (A) = n(β) with β = max{λj | (gj , λi) ∈
G and gj /∈ C}. If β = 1 then WeightP (A) = 0 and if
C = G∗ then WeightP (A) = 1.
Example 3 (Cont.) In the above example, the level of the
argument <{u→ ¬w}, {¬w}, u> is 1 whereas its weight
is n(σ). Concerning the argument <{¬u → ¬l}, {¬l},
¬u>, its level is 1 and its weight is n(1) = 0.
The strengths of arguments make it possible to compare
pairs of arguments as follows:
Definition 3 Let A and B be two arguments in AP . A
is preferred to B iff min(LevelP (A), WeightP (A)) ≥
min(LevelP (B), WeightP (B)).
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Example 4 (Cont.) In our example, the argument <{u→
¬w}, {¬w}, u> is preferred to the argument <{¬u →
¬l}, {¬l}, ¬u>.
As shown before, arguments are constructed in favor of de-
cisions and those arguments can be compared. In what fol-
lows, we show that decisions can also be compared on the
basis of the relevant arguments.
Definition 4 Let d, d′ ∈ D. d is preferred to d′ iff ∃
A ∈ AP , Conclusion(A) = d such that ∀ B ∈ AP ,
Conclusion(B) = d′, then A is preferred to B.
Example 5 (Cont.) In our example, the decision u is pre-
ferred to the decision ¬u since <{u→ ¬w}, {¬w}, u> is
preferred to <{¬u→¬l}, {¬l}, ¬u>.
The following result relates the strengths of arguments and
the preference relations between them to the pessimistic
qualitative utility.
Theorem 1 Let d ∈ D. E∗(d) ≥ α iff ∃ A ∈ AP such that
Conclusion(A) = d and min(LevelP (A),WeightP (A))
= α.
Corollary 1 Let d ∈ D. E∗(d) = α iff ∃ A ∈ AP with
Conclusion(A) = d and min(LevelP (A),WeightP (A))
= α such that A is preferred to any argument A′ with
Conclusion(A′) = d.
3.2 Optimistic Criterion
In the optimistic point of view, we are interested in finding
a decision d (if it exists) which is consistent with the knowl-
edge base and the goals (i.e. K∗ ∧ {d} ∧ G∗ 6= ⊥). This
is optimistic in the sense that it assumes that goals may be
attained as soon as their negation cannot be proved.
Unlike the pessimistic case, in the optimistic point of view
we will consider the arguments which show clearly that
goals will not be satisfied by the decision. Indeed, a de-
cision will be considered as being all the better as there
does not exist any strong argument against it. An argument
against a decision is defined as follows:
Definition 5 (Argument CON) An argument against a
decision d is a triple A = <S, C, d> such that:
• d ∈ D
• S ⊆ K∗ and C ⊆ G∗
• S ∪ {d} is consistent
• ∀ gi ∈ C, S ∪ {d} ` ¬gi
• S is minimal and C is maximal (for set inclusion)
among the sets satisfying the above conditions.
S = Support(A) is the support of the argument, C =
Consequences(A) its consequences (the goals which are
not satisfied by the decision d), and d = Conclusion(A)
its conclusion. The setAO gathers all the arguments which
can be constructed from <K, G, D>.
Note that the consequences considered here are the nega-
tive ones.
Example 6 (Cont.) In the above example, there is one ar-
gument against the decision ‘u’: <{u → l}, {¬l}, u>.
There is also a unique argument against the decision ¬u:
<{c, c→ r, r ∧ ¬u→ w}, {¬w}, ¬u>.
How do we compute the levels and weights of such argu-
ments? An argument against a decision is all the stronger
that it is based on the most certain part of the knowledge
and that it attacks a more important goal. An argument
against ”‘d”’ will be all the weaker as it requires the use
of weak knowledge or if it only attacks low priority goals.
This leads us to define the weakness of an argument CON.
Definition 6 (Weakness of an Argument CON) Let A =
<S, C, d> be an argument of AO. The weakness of A is a
pair <LevelO(A), WeightO(A)> such that:
• The level of the argument is LevelO(A) = n(ϕ) such
that ϕ = min{ρi | ki ∈ S and (ki, ρi) ∈ K}. If S = ∅
then LevelO(A) = 0.
• The degree of the argument is WeightO(A) = n(β)
such that β = max{λj such that gj ∈ C and (gj , λi)
∈ G}.
Example 7 (Cont.) In the above example, the level of the
argument <{u → l}, {¬l}, u> is 0 whereas its degree is
n(σ). Concerning the argument <{c, c→ r, r∧¬u→ w},
{¬w}, ¬u>, its level is n(λ), and its degree is 0.
Once we have defined the arguments and their weaknesses,
we are now ready to compare pairs of arguments. Since
we are interested in decisions for which all the arguments
against it are weak, we are interested in the least weak ar-
guments against a considered decision. This leads to the
two following definitions:
Definition 7 Let A and B be two arguments in AO. A
is preferred to B iff max(LevelO(A), WeightO(A)) ≥
max(LevelO(B), WeightO(B)).
Example 8 (Cont.) In the above example, the comparison
of the two arguments amounts to compare n(σ) with n(λ).
As in the pessimistic case, decisions will be compared on
the basis of the relevant arguments.
Definition 8 Let d, d′ ∈ D. d is preferred to d′ iff ∃ A ∈
AO with Conclusion(A) = d such that ∀ B ∈ AO with
Conclusion(B) = d′, then A is preferred to B.
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Example 9 (Cont.) In the above example, the comparison
of the two decisions u and ¬u depends on the respective
values of σ and λ. Namely, if σ (the priority of the goal
“not overloaded”) is small then the best decision will be
to take an umbrella. If certainty degree λ of having rain is
small enough then the best optimistic decision will not be
to take an umbrella.
The following result relates the weaknesses of arguments
and the preference relations between them to the optimistic
qualitative utility.
Theorem 2 Let d ∈ D. E∗(d) ≥ α iff ∃
A ∈ AO with Conclusion(A) = d such that
max(LevelO(A),WeightO(A)) = α.
Corollary 2 Let d ∈ D. E∗(d) = α iff ∃ A ∈ AO with
Conclusion(A) = d andmax(LevelO(A),WeightO(A))
= α such that A is preferred to any argument A′ with
Conclusion(A′) = d.
4 Argumentation-based decision making:
Case of inconsistent bases
In section 3, we have assumed the consistency of both K
and G which is required for Theorem 1 and Theorem 2.
However, the described argumentative approach still makes
sense when G is inconsistent. When K is also inconsistent
things seem different since two problems should be han-
dled at the same time: the decision problem and the one
of handling inconsistency in K. In [1], an argumentation
framework has been proposed for handling inconsistency
in a knowledge base. In this section, we propose a new
framework which computes the ‘best’ decision (if it exists)
by combining ideas from [1] and from the above section.
In the case of pessimistic criterion, two kinds of arguments
can be defined:
• Arguments in favor of decisions (see definition 1).
The set Ap gathers all those arguments.
• Arguments in favor of pieces of knowledge (or be-
liefs). In classical argumentation frameworks for han-
dling inconsistency in knowledge bases, such argu-
ments are seen as logical proofs of the beliefs they
support.
Definition 9 (Argument in favor of a belief) An argu-
ment in favor of a belief is a pair A = <H, h> such
that:
• H ⊆ K∗
• H ` h
• H is consistent and minimal (for set inclusion) among
the sets satisfying the above conditions.
H = Support(A) is the support of the argument and h
= Conclusion(A) its conclusion. The A gathers all the
arguments which can be constructed from K.
As mentioned before, the base K is pervaded with uncer-
tainty. From the certainty degrees, we define the certainty
level of an argument in favor of a belief.
Definition 10 (Certainty level) Let A = <H , h> ∈ A.
The certainty level of A, denoted by Level(A) = min{ρi
| ki ∈ H and (ki, ρi) ∈ K}. If H = ∅ then Level(A) = 1.
In [1], arguments are compared according to their certainty
levels. Hence, some arguments are preferred to others.
Definition 11 Let A and B ∈ A. A is preferred to B iff
Level(A) ≥ Level(B).
An argument in favor of a belief can also be compared with
an argument in favor of a pessimistic decision as follows:
Definition 12 Let A ∈ A and B ∈ AP . A is preferred to
B iff Level(A) ≥ LevelP (B).
In general, since K is inconsistent, arguments in A will
conflict. Moreover, these arguments may also conflict with
arguments in favor of decisions. We make this idea precise
with the notions of undercut and attack:
Definition 13 Let A1 and A2 ∈ A and A3 ∈ AP .
• A1 undercuts A2 iff ∃ h ∈ Support(A2) such that
Conclusion(A1) ≡ ¬ h. In other words, an argu-
ment is undercut iff there exists an argument for the
negation of an element of its support.
• A1 attacks A3 iff ∃h ∈ Support(A3) or ∃h ∈
Consequences(A3) such that Conclusion(A1) ≡
¬h.
We can now define the argumentation system we will use:
Definition 14 (Argumentation system) An argumenta-
tion system is a tuple <AP , A, Undercut , Attack>. This
system gives raise to three classes of arguments:
• The class S of acceptable arguments.
• The class R of rejected arguments. Such arguments
are undercut or attacked by acceptable ones.
• The class C of arguments in abeyance. Such argu-
ments are neither acceptable nor rejected. C = (A ∪
AP ) \ (S ∪R).
In what follows, we will start by defining the acceptable
arguments. The levels of the arguments make it possible to
distinguish different types of relations between arguments
(in favor of beliefs or decisions):
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Definition 15 Let A, B ∈ A ∪ AP , and V ⊆ A ∪ AP .
• B strongly undercuts A (resp. B strongly attacks A) iff
B undercuts A (resp. B attacks A) and it is not the case
that A is preferred to B.
• If B undercuts A (resp. B attacks A) then A defends
itself against B iff A is preferred to B.
• A set of arguments V defends an argument A if there
is some argument in V which strongly undercuts (resp.
strongly attacks) every argument B where B under-
cuts (resp. attacks) A and A cannot defend itself
against B.
Let C gather all non-undercut and non-attacked arguments
and arguments defending themselves against all their un-
dercutting arguments and against all their attackers. In [2],
it was shown that the set of acceptable arguments in favor
of beliefs is the least fixpoint of a function F :
S ⊆ A,
F(S) = {(H,h) ∈ A|(H,h) is defended by S}
This definition is generalized to the case of handling two
types of arguments. Formally:
Definition 16 The set of acceptable arguments in favor of
beliefs and in favor of decisions is:
S =
⋃
Fi≥0(∅) = C ∪
[⋃
Fi≥1(C)
]
Once we have defined the different categories of argu-
ments, we can now define the different categories of de-
cisions.
Definition 17 Let d ∈ D.
• d is a rejected decision iff ∀ A ∈ AP such that
Conclusion(A) = d then A ∈ R.
• d is a candidate decision iff ∃ A ∈ S such that
Conclusion(A) = d.
The candidate decisions can be compared as follows:
Definition 18 Let d and d′ ∈ D. d is pre-
ferred to d′ iff ∃ A ∈ S and Conclusion(A)
= d such that ∀ A′ ∈ S and Conclusion(A′)
= d′, then min(LevelP (A),WeightP (A)) ≥
min(LevelP (A′),WeightP (A′)).
Note that when K is consistent, we retrieve the decision
procedure described in Section 3.
5 Related works
As said in the introduction, some works have been done
on arguing for decision. In [17], no explicit distinction is
made between knowledge and goals. However, in their ex-
amples, values (belonging to a linearly ordered scale) are
assigned to formulas which represent goals. These values
provide an empirical basis for comparing arguments using
a symbolic combination of strengths of beliefs and goals
values. This symbolic combination is performed through
dictionaries corresponding to different kinds of scales that
may be used.
In [4], Bonet and Geffner have also proposed an original
approach to qualitative decision, inspired from Tan and
Pearl [21], based on “action rules” that link a situation and
an action with the satisfaction of a positive or a negative
goal. However in contrast with the previous work and the
work presented in this paper, this approach does not refer
to any model in argumentative inference.
In their framework, there are four parts:
1. a set D of actions or decisions.
2. a set I of input propositions defining the possible in-
put situation. A degree of plausibility is associated
with each input. Thus, I = {(ki, αi)} with αi ∈
{likely, plausible, unlikely}.
3. a set G of prioritized goals such that G = G+ ∪ G−. G+
gathers the positive goals that one wants to achieve
and G− gathers the negative goals that one wants to
avoid. Thus, G = {(gi, βi)} with βi ∈ [0, 1, ...N ].
Note that in our framework what they call here nega-
tive goals are considered in our goal base as negative
literals.
4. a set of action rules AR = {(Ai ∧Ci ⇒ xi, λi), λi ≥
0}, where Ai is an action, Ci is a conjunction of in-
put literals, and xi is a goal. Each action rule has two
measures: a priority degree which is exactly the pri-
ority degree of the goal xi, and a plausibility degree.
This plausibility is defined as follows:
• a rule A ∧ C ⇒ x is likely if any conjunct of C
is likely.
• a rule A∧C ⇒ x is unlikely if some conjunct of
C is unlikely.
• a rule A∧C ⇒ x is plausible if it is neither likely
nor unlikely.
In this approach only input propositions are weighted in
terms of plausibility. Action rules inherit these weights
through the three above rules in a rather empirical man-
ner which depends on the chosen plausibility scale. The
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action rules themselves are not weighted since they are po-
tentially understood as defeasible rules, although no non-
monotonic reasoning system is associated with them. Con-
trastedly, in our approach, we use an abstract scale. More-
over, weighted possibilistic clauses have been shown to
be able to properly handle non-monotonic inference in the
sense of Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor [19]’ preferential
system augmented with rational monotony (see [3]). So
a part of our weighted knowledge may be viewed as the
encoding of a set of default rules. From the above four
bases, reasons are constructed for (against) actions in [4].
Indeed, goals provide reasons for (or against) actions. Pos-
itive goals provide reasons for actions, whereas negative
goals provide reasons against actions. The basic idea be-
hind this distinction is that negative goals should be dis-
carded, and consequently any action which may lead to the
satisfaction of such goals should be avoided. However, the
approach makes no distinction between what we call pes-
simism and optimism. The definition of a ”‘reason”’ in
[4] is quite different from our definition of an argument.
Firstly, a reason considers only one goal and secondly, the
definition is poor since it only involves facts. Finally, in
Bonet and Geffner’s framework, decisions which satisfy
the most important goals are privileged. This is also true
in our approach, but the comparison between decisions can
be further refined, in case of several decisions yielding to
the satisfaction of the most important goals, by taking into
account the other goals which are not violated by these de-
cisions.
6 Conclusion
The paper has sketched a method, agreeing with qualita-
tive possibility-based decision, which enables us to com-
pute and justify best decision choices. We have shown that
it is possible to design a logical machinery which directly
manipulates arguments with their strengths and compute
acceptable and best decisions from them. The approach can
be extended in different various directions. The computa-
tion of the strengths of arguments pro and con can be re-
fined by using vector of values rather than scalar values for
refining max and min aggregation [15], in order to take into
account the presence of several weak points in an argument
for instance. Another extension of this work consists of
allowing for inconsistent knowledge or goal bases as pre-
liminarily discussed in section 4. We are now working on
this point. We are also planning to transpose the approach
to multiple criteria decision making from the one proposed
here for decision under uncertainty, taking advantage of the
close relation between both areas [9].
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8 Appendix: Pessimistic and optimistic
decision criteria
Normalized possibility distributions which map a set of in-
terpretations to a scale are a convenient way of encoding
complete pre-orderings. It makes sense, if information is
qualitative, to represent incomplete knowledge on the ac-
tual state by a possibility distribution pi on S, the set of
(mutually exclusive) states, with values in a plausibility
scale R, and the decision-maker’s preferences on the set
X of (mutually exclusive) consequences, by means of an-
other possibility distribution µ with values on a preference
scale T . Let 0 (resp. 0) and 1 (resp. 1) denote the bottom
and top elements of R (resp. T ). The following representa-
tional conventions are assumed for possibility distributions.
pi(s) = 0 means that s is definitely impossible according
to what is known, and µ(x) = 0 that x is unacceptable as a
consequence. The greater pi(s) (resp. µ(x)), the more plau-
sible s as being the real state of the world (resp. the more
acceptable x as a consequence). pi(s) = 1 (resp. µ(x) =
1) means s is among the most plausible (normal) states and
there may be several s such that pi(s) = 1 (resp. x is among
the most preferred consequences). The utility of a decision
f whose consequence in state s is x = f(s) ∈ X , for all
states s, can be evaluated by combining the plausibilities
pi(s) and the utilities µ(x) in a suitable way. Two qual-
itative criteria that evaluate the worth of decision f have
been proposed in the literature, provided that a commensu-
rateness assumption between plausibility and preference is
made:
Definition 19 Pessimistic criterion
E∗(f) = infs∈S max(n(pi(s)), µ(f(s))), (4)
where n is an order-reversing mapping from R to T (i.e.
n(0) = 1, n(1) = 0, n is a strictly decreasing bijection of
R to T ).
Definition 20 Optimistic criterion
E∗(f) = sups∈S min(m(pi(s)), µ(f(s))), (5)
wherem is an order-preserving map fromR to T (i.e. m(0)
= 0, m(1) = 1 and m is strictly increasing).
These criteria are nothing but the necessity and the possi-
bility measures of fuzzy events, and are special cases of
Sugeno integrals [11]. Maximizing E∗(f) means finding a
decision f , all the highly plausible consequences of which
are also highly preferred. The definition of “highly plau-
sible” is decision-dependent and reflects the compromise
between high plausibility and low utility expressed by the
order-reversing map between the plausibility valuation set
R and the utility valuation set T . It generalizes the max-
min criterion, which is based on the worst possible conse-
quence of the considered decision in the absence of prob-
abilistic knowledge, since if pi is then the set characteristic
function of a subset A of states, E∗(f) is the utility of the
worst consequence of states in A, however unlikely they
are. But the possibilistic criterion is less pessimistic. It
focuses on the idea of usuality since it relies on the worst
plausible consequences induced by the decision (extremely
unusual consequences are neglected). E∗(f) generalizes
the maximax optimistic criterion. The latter evaluation can
be used as a secondary criterion, for breaking ties between
decisions which are equivalent w.r.t. the pessimistic crite-
rion.
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